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Early this year, economists were cautiously optimistic about the state of the
econ omy and were spec u l a ting abo ut the strength of the recovery. A series of
em er ging corpora te scandals have cast a shadow on these hope s , roi l ed the
financial market s , and reve a l ed profound weaknesses that had not previ o u s ly
been recogn i zed . Vi ewing  these devel opm ents from a broader pers pective ,
a number of observers have revisited the issue of the role of government 
vis-à-vis the private sector, challenging widely held precepts about the via-
bility of laissez-faire policies.
These developments will surely influence regulators and other stakeholders
as they craft new rules for the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA).
This important law is the main safeguard by which the government attempts
to  en su re  that  financial  insti tuti ons  treat  low-  and  modera te - i n com e
Americans evenhandedly.At issue in the regulatory overhaul are the various
yardsticks regulators use to judge whether individual institutions are meet-
ing the credit and service needs of low- and moderate-income communities.
The history of the CRA, as told by Kenneth Thomas in this new brief, repre-
sents a classic tug-of-war between various competing interests. When the
government has reviewed the CRA rules in the past, groups with a stake in
the outcome—grassroots activists, regulators, and financial institutions—
struggled mightily to tip the balance of power in their favor. Thomas argues
in this paper that ifthe new rules are to succeed,regulators will have to strike
a delicate balance between these interests.
Several of Th om a s’s proposals illu s tra te this impera tive . To of fs et the ef fects of
a som etimes cozy rel a ti onship bet ween indu s try and govern m ent agen c i e s ,
Th omas su ggests that the rules should mandate very explicit and obj ective meas-
u res of i n s ti tuti on s’ l ending perform a n ce . To rel i eve the bu rden of com p l i a n ce ,
Pref acethe rules should be simplified and pared down to their essen ti a l s . To preven t
banks from taking adva n t a ge of vu l n era ble mem bers of l ow- and modera te -
i n come  com mu n i ti e s , rule  makers  should  adopt  strong  measu res  aga i n s t
“pred a tory len d i n g.”
These ide a s , and the many other useful proposals in this bri ef , should be care-
f u lly con s i dered in the months ahead .As alw ays ,your com m ents are wel com e .
Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, President
August 2002The Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA) is proof that capitalism
can have a corporate conscience without degrading into socialism or ga m -
bling on the other extreme of completely unregulated markets.
1 CRA is
arguably a perfect example of the correct balance between government and
market regulation in a capitalist economy. Too much regulation is as bad as
too much deregulation, as seen in the savings and loan crisis and, more
recently, Enron. Somewhere between regulated and unregulated markets is
the ideal point, or “fair market,” representing the optimum balance between
consumer and industry interests.
There are many reasons why CRA is an example of a fair market regulation:
• By providing credit access to all,it gives everyone an equal chance at (but
no guarantee they will get) their share of the American Dream.
• It is needs-, not race-based, with the focus on the most needy low- and
moderate-income groups.
• It does not require banks to make bad loans or lose money.
• While banks pay a reasonable compliance cost,there is little to no cost
to taxpayers, who get som ething in retu rn for federal subsidies to the
banking indu s try.
• The law has more bark than bite in terms of actual enforcement and is
therefore not overly intrusive to business.
• It relies more on the positive power of disclosure in the market than on
regulatory brute force.
• It is reformed periodically so that it remains responsive to both consumer
and industry interests.
The rules and regulations implementing CRA as developed, applied, and
enforced by the federal bank and thrift regulators are being reformed this
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Optimal CRA Reformyear as part of a mandatory review of this law. Their last major reform in
1995 resulted in what was called the “new CRA,”and banks and thrifts have
been operating under those rules and regulations since that time. The revi-
sions now being drafted are based on the regulators’review of approximately
400 public comments received in October of 2001 and should be released
sometime during the second half of 2002.
The future of CRA depends upon the direction of these reforms. To create
optimal public policy, bank and thrift regulators must reach the ideal 
balance between competing consumer and industry interests. This brief
presents the first comprehensive analysis of the public comments,and con-
cludes with specific recommendations that will lead to optimal CRA reform.
CRA Battlegrounds
The CRA was shepherded through Congress in 1977 by Senator William
Proxmire of Wisconsin.
2 The law is elegantly simple: it encourages (not
requires) federally insured banks and thrifts to help meet the credit needs 
of their entire communities, including low- and moderate-income (LMI)
3
neighborhoods, consistent with safe and sound banking practices. This
means that,in theory, everyone has an equal opportunity to apply for and,if
necessary, be denied credit. Access to credit, which can almost be argued to
be an inalienable right, has no guarantees other than a fair chance to be
accepted or denied based on a bank’s underwriting practices.
In passing the law,Congress determined that regulated financial institutions
are required to serve the convenience and needs of their communities,which
include credit services as well as deposit services. To ensure that they do,
Congress directed the bank and thrift regulators to periodically assess each
institution’s record of meeting community credit needs,and to consider that
record when acting on deposit facility branch or other expansion applica-
tions. These regulators include the Federal Reserve (Fed) and the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and two agencies of the Department
of the Treasury, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and
the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS). This approach afforded community
groups the opportunity to hold up branch, merger, and other expansion
applications while they persuaded regulators to mandate changes in a bank’s
credit practices, a tactic that sometimes resulted in grants to the protesting
gro u p s . Oppon ents  of C RA  label ed  su ch  practi ces  as  nothing  more 
Public Policy Brief 8
Optimal CRA Reformthan “legalized extortion.” In the early years, there was no middle ground:
you were either with the banks or with the community groups. This, like
almost everything else, changed over time.
The CRA Triangle
What quickly developed was a model of consumer, government, and busi-
ness interaction known as the “CRA Triangle”(Thomas 1993,1998).As seen
in Figure 1, an ongoing and often volatile dynamic tension exists among its
three elements or “corners”:
1. Community groups, representing consumer interests
2. Reg u l a tors ,i n f lu en ced and mon i tored by Con gress and the
Ad m i n i s tra ti on, representing the interests of the “public”
3. America’s banks and thrifts subject to CRA (excluding credit unions),
representing the interests of their stockholders
Figure 1 The CRA Triangle
The CRA Triangle in Figure 1 represents an ideally balanced and propor-
tioned model with three equal sides and angles where none is more impor-
tant than another. Community groups and banks together form the base,
with regulators in the middle position, equidistant to both corners. In this
ideal model, the regulators act as impartial referees between community
groups and banks, attempting to fashion a “socially optimal” result benefit-
ing both parties. The reference to optimal public policy in CRA reform is
The Levy Economics Institute o f Bard College 9











GROUPSbased on reaching the ideal balancing point through consideration of poten-
tial conflicts of interest, pressures, and other factors impacting each of the
triangle’s corners.
A tri a n gle must have three corn ers and three side s , but these are not alw ays
equ a l . The “ Fri en dly Reg u l a tor  Hypo t h e s i s” (Th omas 1993, 1998) state s
that reg u l a tors have become far too close to the banks they su ppo s edly 
reg u l a te and som etimes act more like ch eerl e aders than impartial referee s ,
prom o ting one team (the  banking indu s try) over another  (con su m ers ) .
4 I
h ave iden ti f i ed the Fed as the qu i n te s s en tial fri en dly reg u l a tor (Th omas 1993,
1 9 9 8 ) , and Figure 2 dep i cts the re sultant “ Fed - d i s torted ” C RA Tri a n gl e . Th i s
has the fri en dly reg u l a tor coopera ting qu i te cl o s ely with the banks; both of
these corn ers are sign i f i c a n t ly isolated from con su m er intere s t s . A similarly
d i s torted tri a n gle can exist wh en com mu n i ty groups get too close to the
banks providing them funds.
Figure 2 Fed-Distorted CRA Triangle
While it is normally assumed that each corner will act in the best interests 
of its constituent group, this is not always the case. CRA reform would 
certainly benefit if they did so, while avoiding the “Top Ten New CRA
Mistakes” displayed in Table 1 (Thomas 1998). These CRA mistakes are
just as relevant now as they were during the last CRA reform. Even if each
corner truly represents its constituents’ interest, there may be constraining
factors. Just as banks are under stockholder and regulatory pressure, the 
regulators themselves may be under congressional scrutiny, especially in a
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Past Reform Proposals Still Relevant Today
One of the beauties of CRA is that it is periodically reformed to keep it 
current and responsive to the needs of both communities and banks. This
year’s reform,on the law’s 25th anniversary,is the second scheduled after the
first major effort, which resulted in December 1993 and September 1994
proposals prior to the May 1995 final “new”CRA regulations. Table 2 com-
pares the original or “old” CRA regulations to the December 1993 and
September 1994 “new”CRA proposals and the final, May 1995, “new” CRA
regulations.Table 3 compares the assessment factors and performance stan-
dards of the “old” CRA regulations and the May 1995 “new” ones. (Tables
2–6 appear near the back of this Brief, beginning on page 36.) While the 
2002 reform will possibly require multiple proposals, the number of
current comments relative to those submitted during the last reform (see
below) does not suggest that this will be the case.
Regulators realized during the last reform effort that they might not get
everything “right.” They consequently built in a required reform in 2002,
which would give at least five years of experience with all aspects of the new
CRA (transitioned in during 1996 and 1997).
5 Now, with this experience,
those parts of CRA that encourage access to LMI credit can be improved
upon, and those that do not can be eliminated or modified.
In an earlier work (Thomas 1993), I made numerous recommendations to
reform CRA,many of which were adopted in the 1995 final reform effort. I
subsequently restated and argued the need for those recommendations that
were not adopted (Thomas 1998).
financially struggling agency undergoing budget cuts. Community groups,
too, can be the subject of congressional scrutiny that can change the way
they operate and obtain funding. The continuous conflict and cooperation
among the three corners of the balanced CRA Triangle represents the
dynamic tension that keeps the structure strong.Public Policy Brief 12
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Table 1 Top Ten New CRA Mistakes in the CRA Triangle
Top Ten New CRA Mistakes by Community Groups
1. “Selling out”by publicly supporting mergers of banks that have“bought”
the group (and its integrity) 
2. Using direct or indirect“extortion”techniques to obtain direct or indirect
funding for a community group in exchange for not protesting a merger or
other activity
3. Being the first “ambulance-chasing” community group to rush in to“cut a
deal”with a big bank announcing a merger and then publicly supporting it
4. Not publicly disclosing all direct and indirect sources of funds (hard and
“soft”money) from a bank or its affiliate
5. Indiscriminately attacking all banks as being “bad guys,”without making a
legitimate attempt to identify the good and truly outstanding CRA banks
that are making a difference
6 . Focusing exclu s ively on CRA and fair lending issues wi t h o ut being mindful of
the public policy implicati ons of c ri tical “bi g - p i ctu re”financial insti tuti on top-
ics 
7. Concentrating on minority rather than LMI lending data in CRA (as com-
pared to fair lending) analyses
8. Not taking a serious stand challenging a merger or other bank activity
which the group truly believes is counter to the public interest
9. Representing oneself as a community group activist or leader when the real
goal is personal advancement or some other non-community agenda
10. Failing to organize and support a truly independent and non-industry
funded national bank consumer advocacy organization
Top Ten New CRA Mistakes by Regulators
1. Forgetting that federal bank regulators must first and foremost “regulate and
enforce”the (CRA) law
2. Getting far too close and friendly to certain banks 
3. Misallocating resources among the four regulators
4. Engaging in a CRA“competition in laxity” with other regulators
5. Allowing personal subjectivities to cloud and sometimes cover up the facts 
6. Permitting the ultimate new CRA loophole of approving any “certain special
purpose bank”CRA exemption
7. Falling into the credit allocation and unnecessary government intervention
trap by requiring higher and more lending and other goals for strategic plan
approvals.
8. Instead of doing too little in the area of CRA and fair lending enforcement,
going off the deep end by doing way too muchThe Levy Economics Institute o f Bard College 13
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9. Forgetting the focus of the new CRA on LMI borrowers vs. areas and very
small (below $100,000 in revenues) and small businesses and farms vs.mid-
sized and large ones
10. Ignoring the principle of“fair banking” in the merger process 
Top Ten New CRA Mistakes by Banks
1. Spending more time on CRA“bashing”than CRA compliance
2. Choosing the strategic plan option or failing to withdraw a plan once it has
been submitted
3. A small bank, even one with low loan-to-deposit or other ratios, choosing
anything but the streamlined small bank exam 
4. Truly special-purpose banks failing to apply for a limited purpose bank
(LPB) or wholesale bank (WB) designation
5. Not preparing an internal self-assessment using the detailed new CRA exam
procedures 
6. Improperly“managing” the new CRA exam process
7. Inappropriate handling of legitimate CRA public file requests 
8. Not integrating the Qualified Investment test into the bank's overall invest-
ment and corporate contributions plan 
9. Misallocating compliance budgets
10. Letting CRA“run the bank”instead of running the bank according to its
business plan and complying with CRA
Source:The CRA Handbo ok(McGraw-Hill,1998).Public Policy Brief 14
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Proposed 2002 Reform Process
The July 19, 2001 Federal Register notice of the Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (ANPR) for the reform of the CRA regulations begins by rais-
ing some fundamental general issues about the need for and overall
approach to reform (“Proposed Rules”2001).It then identifies eight specific
issues for comment:
1. Large Retail Institutions: Lending, Investment,and Service Tests
2. Small Institutions: The Streamlined Small Institution Evaluation





7. Activities of Affiliates
8. Data Collection and Maintenance of Public Files
Prior to the last reform effort there was only one CRA exam for all types and
sizes of banks, rather than the four identified above (items 1–4), and the 
performance context concept (item 5) did not exist. More importantly, the
last reform effort created the investment and service tests (weighted 25 
percent each) in addition to the basic lending test (weighted 50 percent).
These two new tests, now accounting for 50 percent of the CRA rating, are
required for large retail banks but optional for small ones.
The comment period for the current CRA reform process closed on October
17, 2001. The four bank and thrift regulators received approximately 400 
different comments, only 6 percent of the 6,700 comments received during
the first (December 1993) reform effort. This suggests either satisfaction
with the current regulations or relative indifference or, more likely, some
combination of the two.The Levy Economics Institute o f Bard College 15
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CRA Reform Comment Analysis
For this study,I made multiple Freedom of InformationAct (FOIA) requests
of the four bank and thrift agencies for all submitted comments. (While the
OTS was the only agency to provide these comment letters online, the other
regulators seem to be moving in that direction.) Almost all of the comments
came from either community groups or the bank and thrift industry. With
the exception of a few members of Congress and other government agencies,
the regulators did not submit comments.Again, from the perspective of the
CRA Triangle, the regulators are acting as referees or perhaps arbitrators
to come up with the socially optimal reform proposal that will best meet
public policy goals.
The comments were reviewed, categorized as from either a community
group or the industry, and summarized with respect to the most common
elements of the two views.A common profile quickly developed, oftentimes
the result of the views of the most prominent community groups and indus-
try trade associations. Some national organizations on both the community
group side (such as the National Community Reinvestment Coalition and
the Woodstock Institute) and bank side (such as the Independent Com-
munity Bankers of America) circulated what were essentially form letters,
which added to the quantity but not the quality of comments. Two tables
were prepared using the submitted comments of the most prominent and
representative community groups and industry associations,as well as those
of a few individual financial institutions. Table 4 summarizes 10 industry
views on CRA reform, mainly those of trade groups with a few individual
financial institutions. Table 5 presents a comparable tabulation of 10 views
from the most prominent community groups.
The 20 tabulation summaries in Tables 4 and 5, while accounting for just 5
percent of the roughly 400 total comments, are quite representative of the
overall community and industry views.Using the respective community and
industry profiles adopted in this analysis, in addition to the input from the
remaining comment letters, the optimal reform strategy was developed as
being the one most responsive to both of these corners of the CRA Triangle.
Table 6 summarizes the specific optimal reform recommendations for CRA.
I previously had made many of these (Thomas 1993,1998),and several have
been discussed elsewhere (Thomas 2001a).
The Levy Economics Institute o f Bard CollegePublic Policy Brief 16
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Regulatory Interest in the Investment Test
The first public proposal from a regulator to eliminate the investment test
came from former FDIC chairman Donna Tanoue,who suggested replacing
it with a new community development test (Heller 2000). While the OCC
was the bastion of CRA regulatory intelligence during Eugene Ludwig’s
tenure as comptroller, this function switched to the FDIC when the OCC’s
well-respected CRA guru, Steve Cross, became head of the FDIC’s Division
of Compliance and Consumer Affairs in May 1999. The managing director
of the OTS compliance function and top compliance people from other
agencies joined Division Director Cross the following year. Since the FDIC
was the new CRA regulatory brain trust,this agency’s position on replacing
the investment test was well thought out and responsive to both consumer
and industry interests.
While other regulators have generally been silent on the controversial invest-
ment test, the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco has established and
aggressively promoted an entire investment test infrastructure, generally
perceived as being supportive of this test. For example, its Community
Affairs department has six separate community investment specialists who
put on a series of quarterly roundtables throughout the West. It has its own
Community I nvestments publication, the March 2002 special edition of
which,“A Guide to Community Development Investments,”contains articles
by several nonprofit and for-profit investment test vendors and their contact
information (Federal Reserve 2002).These and other vendors have appeared
at numerous Fed-sponsored CRA events to promote qualified investments,
and many have been successful in this regard with banks and thrifts in that
region. Unlike most of the other Federal Reserve banks, San Francisco’s has
a more pro-industry than pro-consumer reputation (Thomas 1998).
This background is relevant to the extent that the Fed’s investment test 
infrastructure serves as a motivation to maintain the status quo. If there
is no investment test or, alternatively, a significantly reduced one, is there
a need for the San Francisco Fed’s glossy Community I nvestmentsmagazine 
or their community investment conferences? What about their community
i nve s tm ent  spec i a l i s t s , the  most  sen i or  of wh om  prob a bly  devel oped 
valuable contacts in the banking and securities industries? Good public 
policy by Federal Reserve bank regulators dictates that their one and only
concern be what is in the public interest,giving appropriate consideration to
both consumers and the industry alike. The Fed’s position on CRA reform
Public Policy BriefThe Levy Economics Institute o f Bard College 17
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should not be influenced by their San Francisco bank’s significant invest-
ment test infrastructure.
Similar po ten tial con f l i cts may exist in some very large banks that have like-
wise built up significant inve s tm ent (and servi ce) test infra s tru ctu re s .What if
an em p l oyee was hired because of ex pertise and con t acts in these specific are a s
that now might be el i m i n a ted or gre a t ly cut back? Aga i n , s tock h o l der ra t h er
than em p l oyee special interests should dict a te bank policy on the inve s tm en t
or servi ce te s t s ,and reg u l a tors must con s i der the source of a ll com m en t s .
Elimination of Investment and ServiceTests
Many large banks and bank trade associations are rightfully asking that CRA
be returned to its LMI lending roots by abolishing the investment test and,
to a lesser extent, service test experiments, or at least making them optional
as is presently the case for small banks. Community groups generally want
to keep everything in CRA and add new requirements. They are loathe to
admit that any part of the law or its implementing rules and regulations 
cannot be cost-benefit justified, as the apparent goal is to increase, not
decrease, the coverage and scope of the law. This can, however, be counter-
productive since the extraneous investment and service tests reduce by 50
percent the weight given to LMI lending. For this reason,good public policy
dictates that these two tests be reduced to individual performance evaluation
factors under the lending test, as long as they can be documented as LMI
credit related (see Table 6).At some point,these two tests could even become
optional to improve a Satisfactory rating, as is presently the case under the
streamlined small-bank exam.
6
Reduce Grade Inflation by RemovingTwo ofThree
Inflated Tests
The most com preh en s ive CRA grade inflati on analysis of actual large - b a n k
exams reve a l ed that fully 71 percent of the ra ti n gs on the inve s tm ent test were
i n f l a ted by one grade , com p a red to 32 percent and 29 percent com p a ra bl e
i n f l a ti on ra tes for the lending and servi ce te s t s , re s pectively (Th omas 1998).
Thu s , the inve s tm ent test is a pri m a ry cause of overa ll CRA grade inflati on .
The Levy Economics Institute o f Bard CollegePublic Policy Brief 18
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Several government agencies have examined inconsistency and other prob-
lems associated with CRA exams and ratings (see U.S General Accounting
Office 1995 and Office of Inspector General 1998),but have not,perhaps for
political reasons, broached the highly controversial issue of grade inflation.
This practice changed, however, with an OTS December 21, 2000 internal
evaluation of public performance evaluations (PEs), which was “unable to
validate the appropriateness of the investment component ratings” for 41
percent of its sample (see Office of Inspector General 2001).
7 Regarding the
investment test, the OTS study found “apparent rating inconsistencies” as
well as “limited instances where the investments component may have been
rated higher than warranted.” The analysis concluded with 10 very useful
recommendations to ensure that PEs provide accurate performance assess-
ments.The optimal public policy reforms advocated in this brief adopt them
all (see Table 6).
There is a general consensus that grade inflation, not just of individual tests
but of overall ratings, is a serious concern. One remedy generally advanced
by community groups is to make both the investment and service tests much
more quantitative and rigorous, often with new ratios and guidelines. This,
however, would result in an additional burden not just for banks and thrifts,
but also for regulators,some of whom are facing budget cuts.
The optimal solution to reducing grade inflation with these two tests is not
to expand their data and analysis but to eliminate them by converting them
into separate performance rating factors under the key lending test. These
tests will be appropriately counted to the extent that they benefit LMI credit,
but not at a morbidly obese 50 percent of the final rating.
The service test includes both retail banking and CD services.One reason for
the considerable inflation in this test is the fact that every bank, a “financial
services”business by definition, provides some sort of retail banking service
and is therefore entitled to some credit. Many banks make no qualified
investments, and some make few if any loans during certain review periods.
But every bank, including Internet banks, offers some retail banking service
under the terms of its charter.
Another problem with the service test is the confusion that sometimes 
exists between its main retail banking and community development (CD)
components. CD services are often subjectively defined by examiners. CD
and retail banking services that can be documented to encourage access to
Public Policy BriefThe Levy Economics Institute o f Bard College 19
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and provision of LMI credit are useful and deserve credit. But allowing 25
percent of a bank’s CRA rating to be determined by services effectively
dilutes the lending test.
For the above and other reasons, CD and retail banking should be folded
into the lending test as separately evaluated factors, but only if they can be
documented to be LMI credit related. Under this proposed reform, banks
and community groups involved in LMI credit-related activities will still
benefit, but not to the same degree.
Community Groups Potentially Conflicted in Defending
Investment and ServiceTests
Community group attempts to defend the nonlending tests are not only
unrealistic but also somewhat self-serving. In the case of the service test,
some groups benefit by acting either directly as a beneficiary of some CD
services or indirectly by being compensated by banks for performing such
services (for example, home ownership counseling to LMI homebuyers).
This is a relatively minor concern compared to the investment test, which
some groups have significant financial incentives to maintain. Bank contri-
butions to community groups count as qualified CRA investments, and the
groups may feel this source of funding will be reduced or perhaps even elim-
inated without a stand-alone investment test.
Th ere would be an even gre a ter incen tive to defend the inve s tm ent test in the
case wh ere a major nati onal com mu n i ty group and a for- profit CRA inve s t-
m ent firm have an interl ocking Boa rd of Di rectors and a “l ogro ll i n g”a rra n ge-
m ent wh ere each prom o tes its affiliati on with the other in news l et ters and
web s i tes in ad d i ti on to having a formal agreem ent that rel a tes com mu n i ty
group funding to CRA inve s tm ents sold. To defend a qu e s ti on a ble test that
can financially and otherwise ben efit com mu n i ty groups is one thing, but to
propose new gra n t - m e a su ring ra tios or aw a rd bonus credits for grants as
s ome groups have done is pushing the envel ope . Com mu n i ty groups should
re a l i ze that they received grants from banks before the inve s tm ent test and
wi ll con ti nue to receive them even if that test is el i m i n a ted or gre a t ly redu ced
in scope .
The  main  defense  of the  inve s tm ent  test  by  com mu n i ty  groups  is  an 
of t - repe a ted 1999 qu o te from Fed Ch a i rman Greenspan stressing the need
The Levy Economics Institute o f Bard CollegePublic Policy Brief 20
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for gre a ter “equ i ty ” i nve s tm ent in small businesses in lower- i n come com-
mu n i ties (Greenspan 1999). This is, u n fortu n a tely, s om ewhat mislead i n g,
as most CRA “qu a l i f i ed inve s tm en t s” u n der the inve s tm ent test are not of
this  type  but  ra t h er  purch a s ed  and  rep u rch a s ed  LMI, m ort ga ge - b acked
s ec u ri ties  (MBS)  or  even  certain  municipal  bonds  and  minori ty  bank 
certi f i c a tes of depo s i t . This is a very important disti n cti on , because tru e
equ i ty inve s tm ents as referen ced in the Greenspan qu o te are the excepti on
ra t h er than the ru l e .
“Community Enrichment Act”
An entire CRA investment industry has been created by Wall Street to take
advantage of the shortage of qualified investments, which are so in demand
that there is now a “CRA premium.” The problem is that many of the Wall
Street opportunists who have moved into CRA are more interested in 
profiteering from CRA investments than increasing LMI credit. This is not
surprising: it happens whenever Wall Street meets Main Street.
Many other CRA profiteers are getting rich from the investment test (Kellner
2001). Unfortunately, their activities have resulted in few visible improve-
ments to LMI credit access (Thomas 2002b).The current investment test has
led to many “qualified investments” that merely recycle existing ones while 
creating no new underlying LMI loans. One LMI loan may be bought and
sold many times and then securitized and repeatedly traded as an MBS.
Since it is defined as a “qualified” CRA investment, many banks get CRA
credit for one underlying LMI loan.
While investment test vendors and even their banking clients will argue that
such activities “enhance access to LMI credit,” this is not unlike their Wall
Street brethren churning a portfolio for commissions.Some MBS have been
churned so much by the investment test that the underlying LMI purpose 
of the original loan and CRA are long forgotten. A community banker
originating an LMI loan may remember the property location and perhaps
the name of the family.MBS purchasers only remember the amount of CRA
premium paid to the securities broker and how much credit they received
from the CRA examiner. All of this is the result of the investment test 
created in the last CRA reform.
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The Proposed Streamlined Exam for Large Banks
The streamlined small-institution evaluation has been quite popular with
the industry, although persistent grade inflation has been a continued prob-
lem. The exam is totally focused on lending and includes specific LMI ratios;
the optional investment and service tests may allow a Satisfactory rating at a
small bank to be increased to an Outstanding one.
There is no question that the small-bank streamlined exam is less of a regu-
latory burden than the comparable large-bank retail exam. According to
an October 17,2001 CRA reform comment by the California Bankers Asso-
ciation,one member bank that had recently graduated from the small- to the
large-bank exam experienced over $50,000 in additional costs unrelated to
the investment of new dollars or services in its community.
One of the goals of good CRA public policy is to streamline the large-bank
exam as much as possible. The optimal CRA reform, as seen in Table 6,
eliminates two of the three current tests, with the result that the new lend-
ing test counts for 100 percent rather than half of the overall CRA rating.
The 1995 revised CRA regulations make an important distinction between
the performance criteria within each test and the factors within the per-
formance ratings matrix used by examiners. The lending test contains five
performance criteria and seven rating factors. Since there are five possible
ratings in its performance ratings matrix,there are 35 possible cells.By com-
parison, the investment test contains four performance criteria and three
factors in its 15-cell ratings matrix, while the service test has six criteria and
four factors in 20 cells. Thus,there are a total of 70 possible cells in all three
large-bank exam matrices.
The CRA curren t ly specifies five perform a n ce cri teria for the lending te s t :l en d-
ing activi ty,geogra phic distri buti on ,borrower ch a racteri s ti c s ,CD len ding, and
innovative or flexible lending. The proposed streamlined exam for large
banks would include eight criteria. The first four would remain the same,
but the fifth would be replaced by “Qualitative LMI lending characteristics.”
This factor would also include consideration of any predatory or other
adverse credit factors that would affect LMI people or areas, small busi-
nesses, or farms. Conversely, a bank would be given additional credit for
graduating qualified LMI subprime customers into prime ones. The three
n ew eva lu a ti on cri teria would be inve s tm en t s ,CD servi ce s , and retail banking
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services that can be documented as helping to meet the credit needs of LMI
people and neighborhoods as well as small businesses or farms.
Thus, the proposed streamlined large-bank exam summarized in Table 6





5. Qualitative LMI lending characteristics
6. LMI credit-related investments (replacing the investment test)
7. LMI credit-related CD services (replacing the CD portion of the 
service test)
8. LMI credit-related retail banking services (replacing the retail banking
service portion of the service test)
The actual lending test perform a n ce ra ti n gs matrix from the 1995 reg u l a ti on s
d ivi des geogra phic distri buti on into two items and adds a cri teri on de a l i n g
with loans to the high ly econ om i c a lly disadva n t a ged , for a total of s even per-
form a n ce ra ting factors .L i kewi s e ,the propo s ed stre a m l i n ed large-bank ex a m
would convert the ei ght new cri teria into the fo ll owing 10 ra ti n gs factors :
1. Lending activity levels responsive to assessment area (AA) credit needs
2. Percentage of loans in AA
3. Borrower distribution by income and business/farm size in AA
4. Geographic distribution of loans in AA
5. Lending  to  high ly  econ om i c a lly  disadva n t a ged  geogra phies  and 
low-income people and very small businesses in AA
6. Qualitative LMI lending characteristics
7. CD lending activities
8. LMI credit-related investments
9. LMI credit-related CD services
10. LMI credit-related retail banking services
The re sultant matri x ,p u bl i s h ed in each PE , would have these 10 factors ti m e s
f ive po s s i ble ra ti n gs , for 50 po s s i ble cell s .While an explicit wei gh ting sch em e
for the different factors would re sult in a more qu a n ti t a tive approach , t h e
perform a n ce con text and rel a ted exam factors should determine the appro-
pri a te wei gh ti n g. As noted in Ta ble 6, the overa ll CRA ra ting would now be
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one of f ive ra t h er than four po s s i ble ra ti n gs . Ta ble 6 also contains specific 
recom m en d a ti ons rega rding perform a n ce eva lu a ti on procedu re s , su ch as a
ti m e - s en s i tive eva lu a ti on (and pro rata wei gh ting) over the revi ew peri od and
l i m i ted (pro rata) credit for CRA- qu a l i f ying activi ties com m encing within six
m onths of an ex a m’s starting date .
The proposed exam would be streamlined for both large retail banks and
examiners alike, because it would involve one rather than three tests 
(a reduction of 67 percent); 10 rather than 15 performance criteria (a 33 
percent reduction); one rather than three performance ratings matrices 
(a 67 percent reduction);and 50 rather than 70 individual rating matrix cells
(a 29 percent reduction). Those large banks with extensive CRA investments
and services would continue to garner credit under this streamlined exam,
as long as they were legitimately LMI credit related. In the event that grade
inflation and other problems associated with the investment and service
tests continue,the tests could become optional factors as is presently the case
with the small-bank exam. Although this would allow for a smooth transi-
tion,the investment and service tests might ultimately have to be eliminated.
Expansion of Definition of “Small” Banks
to Qualify for Streamlined Exam
The number one CRA reform priority for small banks is to increase the 
minimum allowable size by which they can qualify for the streamlined exam.
Community groups are against such increases. Currently, a small bank is
defined as an independent institution with assets of $250 million or less or
an affiliate of a holding company with less than $1 billion in assets. The
streamlined test represents a significant time and cost savings compared to
the large-bank exam.
As seen in Table 4, most bank trade groups would increase the former
number to at least $1 billion and either remove the latter requirement or
increase it to as much as $5 billion. Community groups, on the other hand,
as seen in Table 5,would keep this definition unchanged and even make the
exam less streamlined. The optimal solution from a public policy perspec-
tive is to double the current independent minimum asset level to $500 
million,a number commonly associated with a “community bank”in today’s
competitive environment. The comparable holding company minimum
should likewise double to $2 billion.
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The proposed $500 million and under definition for a community bank has
been used by many regulators. For example, a recent Fed article (Hall and
Yeager 2002) noted, “Community banks are typically smaller banks; most
have fewer than $500 million in assets.” An OCC economist (Whalen 2001)
used the same dollar range to define a community bank. In fact, when
responding to the CRA regulators, several small banks and thrifts departed
from the boilerplate letter circulated by their national trade groups and 
recommended a $500 million and under rather than $1 billion asset level as
a reasonable definition of a small bank.
Prob a bly the most com pelling argument in favor of this def i n i ti on is the fact
that it would en compass abo ut 90 percent of the nati on’s nearly 10,000 banks
and  thri f t s , com p a red  to  the  ro u gh ly  80  percent  covered  with  the  $250 
m i ll i on and less def i n i ti on .As suming the previ o u s ly cited $50,000 reg u l a tory
cost of gradu a ting from a small to a large retail bank is acc u ra te , the approx-
i m a tely 1,000 banks and thrifts in the $250–500 mill i on asset ra n ge wo u l d
h ave some $50 mill i on ava i l a ble for com mu n i ty rei nve s tm ent or other pur-
po s e s . Making the qu a n tum leap to $1 bi ll i on and less would take in nearly
95 percent of the indu s try, h a rdly a re a s on a ble basis for a small / l a r ge size 
d i s ti n cti on . The fact that the large-bank exam would be stre a m l i n ed under
these reform recom m en d a ti ons might som ewhat redu ce the urgency of bei n g
de s i gn a ted a “s m a ll ”b a n k .G ood public policy should not re sult in sign i f i c a n t
d i f feren ces in com p l i a n ce bu rden based solely on size .
Misguided Community Group Proposal to
Make CRA Race-Based
Community groups are flat-out wrong to ask that CRA become race-based,
something that could jeopardize the future of this needs-based law. Nothing
could be more damaging to CRA than to change or even redirect its primary
focus away from LMI lending.Most leading community groups have explic-
itly called for a race-based CRA in addition to its statutory needs-based
(LMI) history. Even some respected researchers have apparently confused
the Act’s statutory intent by frequently mentioning “minority”communities
alongside “lower-income”ones in their discussions of CRA (“25th” 2002).
The Na ti onal Com mu n i ty Rei nve s tm ent Coa l i ti on (NCRC ) , one of m a ny
Wa s h i n g ton ,D. C . – b a s ed com mu n i ty gro u p s ,wants minori ties to be ex p l i c-
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i t ly con s i dered on the lending test just as LMI people and areas are . Th e
Greenlining In s ti tute argues in its October 15, 2001 CRA reform com m en t
that “C RA exams should not be co l orbl i n d ,” c i ting the large percen t a ge of
m i n ori ties in Ca l i forn i a . What nei t h er com mu n i ty group men ti on s , h ow-
ever, is the fact that Ca l i forn i a , the most heavi ly pop u l a ted U. S .s t a te ,is now
“m a j ori ty - m i n ori ty ” according to the 2000 Cen su s , wh i ch means that over
h a l f (51  percent  to  be  ex act)  of its  re s i dents are  de s i gn a ted  minori ti e s ,
s pec i f i c a lly  Lati n o s , Asian  Am eri c a n s , Af rican  Am eri c a n s , and  Na tive
Am ericans (Mu ñ oz 2000). Cen sus Bu reau data analy zed by the Cen ter on
Urban and Metropolitan Policy at the Broo k i n gs In s ti tuti on found that 52
of the 100 most populous cities in the Un i ted States are majori ty - m i n ori ty
( S chmitt 2001). In fact , s ome dem ogra ph ers have su gge s ted that the en ti re
n a ti on wi ll be majori ty - m i n ori ty at or short ly after the midpoint of the 21st
cen tu ry.
Within a majority-minority state or large city, a race-based CRA proposal
would lessen the public policy benefits of the law. This is because limited
resources would be diverted from the neediest people and areas to those that
may or may not be in need, but are associated with a certain ethnic group.
Just as was the case with affirmative action programs, this would make CRA
more controversial than ever and more than likely reduce its strong biparti-
san support. CRA has survived for 25 years as a race-blind law, and any
changes in this regard could jeopardize it.
The banking industry would likely not even consider amending CRA to
become race-based, although some segments have proposed deviating from
its LMI-based focus. Wachovia Corporation, for example, in its October 17,
2001 CRA reform comment, proposed that the “community development”
definition be expanded to include all such projects rather than only those 
in LMI areas. This misguided proposal, like the race-based idea from
community groups, would likewise serve to undermine the needs-based
foundation of CRA.
8
Subprime vs. Predatory Lending Issues
Community groups are also playing with a two-edged sword in their efforts
to heavily regulate subprime lending to root out predatory problems. This 
is because many community group leaders fail to distinguish between
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subprime lending, which is “good,”and predatory lending, which is not. For
example, the head of a national coalition tied the two concepts together in
past congressional testimony by expressing concern over the exponential
growth of “subprime (and potentially predatory) lending” (NCRC 2000).
Another national community group issued a study lambasting predatory
lending and “financial apartheid,” but all of the supporting data referred to
subprime loans (ACORN 2000).
Even worse are those who would criticize others merely for being associated
with a subprime product.This was the case with a community representative
turned professor whose Ph.D. dissertation on CRA (Metzger 1999) attacked
a prominent housing finance professor for his “ties to the subprime indus-
try,” due to his association with a firm that sells mortgage origination soft-
ware to prime and subprime lenders alike!
Some community groups even propose penalizing banks that do legitimate
subprime lending. For example, the October 2, 2001 CRA reform comment
by the NCRC states that “su bprime lending must not count as mu ch as pri m e
l en d i n g.” The  October  15, 2001  com m ent  of the  Ca l i fornia  Rei nve s tm en t
Committee reports that its members “overwhelmingly state that financial
institutions should receive little to no credit for subprime lending.”
This confusion between predatory and subprime lending and, worse yet,
stigmatizing of the latter may have the perverse impact of limiting the avail-
ability of credit to CRA’s target group—LMI individuals and areas—where
subprime lending is important. Well-meaning public officials, under pres-
sure from vocal community groups,may be throwing the CRA baby out with
the predatory bath water. This is not good public policy.
The Fed has attem pted to cl a rify the disti n cti on bet ween su bprime and
pred a tory  len d i n g : “ Just  as  the  ex p a n s i on  of su bprime  lending  has
i n c re a s ed access to cred i t , the ex p a n s i on of its unfortu n a te co u n terp a rt ,
pred a tory  len d i n g, has  made  many  low - i n come  borrowers  worse  of f”
( Gra m l i ch 2000). A joint report by two federal dep a rtm ents on pred a tory
l ending made the same con clu s i on : “Su bprime lending serves an impor-
tant ro l e , by providing loans to borrowers who do not meet the credit stan-
d a rds for the prime mort ga ge market . Some borrowers in the su bpri m e
m a rket , h owever, m ay be parti c u l a rly vu l n era ble to abu s ive lending prac-
ti ce s” (HUD 2000).
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Not all community groups confuse subprime and predatory lending. The
Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation,a public nonprofit established by
Congress,identified still another problem with the wholesale condemnation
of subprime lending in its October 17, 2001 CRA reform comment: “We
would stress. . . that discouraging regulated institutions from directly or
indirectly engaging in subprime lending could prove counterproductive.
Regulated institutions are more likely to provide the service in a responsible
manner,” as opposed to unregulated institutions, some of which are “totally
unscrupulous”according to this source.
Another community group that has apparently seen the light on subprime
lending is the Greenlining Institute. An article about Washington Mutual,
the nation’s third-largest subprime mortgage lender, quotes Greenlining’s
legal counsel as saying,“Our position from the beginning has been that we
want every major regulated bank doing subprime”(Mandaro 2001).
The community corner of the CRA Triangle has influenced most of the 
public policy involving subprime and predatory lending, including numer-
ous city, county, state, and federal actual and proposed antipredatory laws.
Unless the subprime lending industry develops a unified voice and improved
image for its “high risk” lending product, public policy, including possible
federal preemption of local and state antipredatory laws, will continue to be
weighted against the industry (Thomas 2001b). Such a failure of the CRA
Triangle will not result in good public policy.
It makes sense that the qualitative aspects of LMI lending be evaluated in the
context of a CRA exam (see recommendation in Table 6). Those banks and
their affiliates that can, for example, document a significant effort to move
qualified LMI subprime borrowers to the lower-cost prime market, should
receive credit under this qualitative factor. Those carrying loans deemed to
be predatory would be downgraded. Contrary to the position of most com-
munity groups, this analysis should not include any race-based factors,
which are the province of fair-lending exams.
Assessment Area Definition
Banks and thrifts generally prefer assessment areas (AAs) to be as small
as possible, while community groups (and oftentimes regulators) take the
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opposite view. A larger AA means that loan, investment, and service per-
formance will be evaluated for an expanded area. This can be costly for
banks and thrifts but advantageous to community groups in the expanded
areas, if they can then benefit from additional grants (such as a “qualified
investment” under the investment test).
Banks and thrifts are generally happy with the current AA approach,as they
have the flexibility to define this key geography with but a few constraints.
Community groups, on the other hand, would eliminate some of this 
flexibility, especially for Internet and other banks with alternative delivery
systems, where the groups feel a national AA might be appropriate. These
banks and others using the mail,telephone,or brokers to extend credit often
have pockets of borrowers all over the country, but just a small percentage
(often 15–25 percent or less) from within its AA, typically narrowly defined
around its legal residence. Such banks are penalized in their CRA exams due
to the low percentage of lending in their AAs,but local geography is not the
most relevant concept for such banks.
We must keep in mind, however, that such banks are relatively few in 
number,excluding those legitimately covered under the limited purpose and
wholesale bank test. Although there was much hype about Internet banks
during the dotcom era, only a handful remain; some have failed, while 
others have opened traditional brick-and-mortar branches.
It is not good public policy to establish a new AA reg u l a tory fra m ework based
on the special circ u m s t a n ces of a rel a tively small nu m ber of f a i rly new and
of ten times stru ggling banks, as the new reg u l a ti ons wi ll most likely prove an
u n due  bu rden  for  all  banks. Some  com mu n i ty  groups  have  propo s ed  that
In tern et and similar banks define their A As on the basis of t h eir lending market
s h a re  in  local  market s , using  a  very  small  0.5  percent  minimum  cri teri on .
As suming this is a re a s on a ble approach ,the rel evant cutof f would have to be sig-
n i f i c a n t ly high er, perhaps 5–10 percent or more , before the su bj ect bank’s rel a-
tive perform a n ce had a meaningful impact on the local credit market .
An o t h er su gge s ti on for eva lu a ting the perform a n ce of In tern et banks is to
eva lu a te their perform a n ce under the CD test as ori gi n a lly propo s ed by the
OTS . This proposal had appeal wh en it appe a red that they might become so
popular as to ju s tify their own special purpose category, as had limited pur-
pose and wholesale banks.However,the actual ex peri en ce with this exam su g-
gests that it be re s erved for tru ly special purpose banks that are not retail on e s .
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Based on the small number of pure Internet banks, it makes more sense to
evaluate them as the retail banks they are, but give them credit for any LMI-
related activity outside of their AAs as long as they are meeting local LMI
credit demand. This same approach can be applied to any bank with a non-
traditional delivery system.Thus,this recommendation would maintain the
AA status quo but require examiners to report on the LMI loan characteris-
tics of such a bank’s entire portfolio, regardless of its location. This means
that even if an Internet or other nontraditional bank made a very small
percentage of its loans in its defined AA, the proper performance context
analysis would result in a lower weighting of the AA loan percentage rating
f actor rel a tive to other perform a n ce factors , e s pec i a lly non l ocal LMI len d i n g.
The examiner evaluating the LMI borrower and geographic characteristics
of the nonlocal lending would give appropriate credit for such CRA lending
regardless of where it occurred. This would be similar to the recommended
approach under the CD test of giving CRA credit for LMI-related CD
activities anywhere, even if outside of the AA or broader statewide and
regional area. The bottom line should be CRA credit for any legitimate LMI
credit-related activity, regardless of location, as long as local LMI credit
needs are first being met.
Elimination of the Strategic Plan Option
The last CRA reform effort created the strategic plan option for all types 
and sizes of banks. It is good public policy to eliminate regulations such as
this, which have few benefits relative to significant costs and uncertainties
(Thomas 1998). Eliminating this ill-conceived option would result in addi-
tional streamlining by reducing the number of possible exams from four to
three.While most banks would rather keep the strategic plan option in their
CRA regulatory closet for possible use, very few have selected it.
9 It is some-
what ironic that the banking industry would favor a reduction in the regu-
l a tory  bu rden  but  nevert h eless  insist  on  keeping  a  ra rely  used  and
controversial CRA regulation on the books.
Com mu n i ty groups are gen era lly in favor of keeping this or any ex i s ti n g
p a rt of the reg u l a ti on s , but few have con du cted an obj ective eva lu a ti on .
One of the excepti ons is NCRC , wh i ch in its October 2, 2001 CRA reform
com m ent argues for the el i m i n a ti on of the stra tegic plan opti on : “ It has
been abu s ed too of ten ; banks decl a re easy goals and ex a m i n ers approve
these goa l s .” No te , h owever, that the group is proposing the el i m i n a ti on 
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of an opti on that some of its mem bers ch a m p i on ed du ring the 1993–95
reform  proce s s . In  fact , one  of that  gro u p’s  directors  was  reportedly
re s pon s i ble for su gge s ting or prom o ting this opti on to the reg u l a tors . A
recent  proposal  by  repre s en t a tives  of both  NCRC  and  the  Green l i n i n g
In s ti tute to expand CRA to insu ra n ce provi ders even call ed for “s tra tegi c
com mu n i ty inve s tm ent plans” a m ong their su gge s ted new requ i rem en t s
( G a m boa and Tayl or 2001).
Improvement of Public Performance Evaluations
I made a number of specific recommendations to improve PEs for each of
the different types of CRA exam (Thomas 1998). A recent analysis by the
Office of the Inspector General of the OTS made 10 recommendations to
improve the quality of its PEs (OIG 2001), most of which were identical to
those I previously suggested.
Good public policy would dictate that each of the following OTS recom-
mendations for PEs become mandatory for all agencies as part of the current
CRA reform:
1. Better ensure complete and full disclosure as to how examiners evalu-
ate each component area in arriving at the component ratings.
2. Seek, through Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council
(FFIEC) interagency deliberations, further regulatory guidance as to
how an institution’s CRA performance is to be considered and weighed
in the application process.
3. Consider establishing internal written guidance to better ensure that
CRA performance is taken into consideration in a consistent and uni-
form manner in the application process.
4. Ensure that performance context information is appropriately incor-
porated into the PE report.
5. Seek, through FFIEC interagency deliberations, to establish more
objective regulatory criteria as to how investments are to be assessed.
6. Provide for quality assurance reviews of CRA examinations, to include
a broader analysis comparing inter- and intraregional examinations
and PE reports for consistency.
7. Seek, through FFIEC interagency deliberations, to establish objective
criteria and/or clarification as to what constitutes strong lending
and CD lending when these activities are used in support of a Low
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Satisfactory investment rating for thrifts with few or no qualifying
investments.
8. Improve controls to better ensure that examiners contact community
groups and that the results of these contacts are more fully described
in the PE report.
9. Assess the value of requiring a comparison of thrift lending relative to
assessment area demographics to enhance the performance context of
a thrift’s lending.
10. Provide examiners with further guidance to ensure greater consistency
in applying the agency’s approach to nontraditional thrifts.
Need for Specialized Compliance Examiners and Exams
The topic of specialized compliance examiners and exams relative to those
for safety and soundness at two of the four regulatory agencies has only
recently become a public policy issue in banking. The primary motivating
forces are budget cuts in the case of the OTS,and efforts to reduce the regu-
latory risk burden in the case of the FDIC. While budget or regulatory
burden cuts could occur anywhere within these two agencies,it appears that
the compliance and CRA areas may be most adversely affected.
10 In this case,
good public policy is undermined to the extent that “friendly regulators”are
acting more in the industry’s interest rather than that of consumers.
The FDIC’s program (2002) was euphemistically titled “Reducing Burden
on Banks and the Public.”It appears,however, that all of its proposed reduc-
tions focus on banks and benefit the public only under the usually unre-
alistic assumption that cost reductions are passed on to them. Part of the 
FDIC’s action under this program was to fold its Division of Consumer and
Com p l i a n ce Af f a i rs ,wh i ch had been indepen dent since 1991,i n to the Divi s i on
of Su pervi s i on . That one policy shift alone has significant CRA ra m i f i c a ti on s ,
because the form er divi s i on , u n der Steve Cro s s , who has since left the FDIC,
was the informal CRA reg u l a tory nerve cen ter.To the ex tent that the divi s i on
is redu ced in import a n ce or, worse yet , con s o l i d a ted into another su ggests a
n on - C RA and more gen era lly non con su m er mindset at the FDIC.
The OTS budget cuts received much more interest because that agency has
long been rumored to be a candidate for consolidation into the OCC,also a
part of the Department of the Treasury. The OTS has lost money every year
since 1998, is reeling from bad public relations after a few spectacular thrift
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failures, and expects losses in 2002 of nearly $2 million (Blackwell and
Garver 2002).
Assessment income at the OTS dropped markedly during the past decade
as the number of thrifts fell by more than half. The agency responded by
raising fees and examination charges. This angered many thrifts, causing
some to convert to banks. The recent conversion of one of its larger
members (Cl evel a n d ’s Ch a rter One Financial) to an OCC bank reportedly
redu ced assessment income at the OTS by $4.2 million annually and caused
their projected 2002 operating deficit to swell from $2 million to $5 million
(Garver 2002).
The vulnerability of the OTS to the loss of another large thrift calls into
question its continued viability as an effective regulator in the public inter-
est. According to March 31, 2002 asset totals from the FDIC, there are three
other thrifts larger than the $37.7 billion Charter One, with the $275.2 
billion and growing Washington Mutual (Wamu) being the largest by far.
With total thrift industry assets of $998 billion as of that same time accord-
ing to the OTS,Wamu represents a whopping 28 percent of the entire indus-
try. It is also the nation’s third largest subprime mortgage lender.
Considering that the OTS probably could not survive as an independent
agency if Wamu defected, how can it be an effective regulator of that giant
thrift? Will the OTS really tell it what it thinks or be more concerned about
upsetting Wamu and losing its “business”? Who wants to be the OTS exam-
iner willing to tell it “no,” especially in a sensitive area such as subprime 
lending? It seems appropriate to ask the question: Does the OTS regulate
Wamu or does Wamu regulate the OTS? Such important public policy mat-
ters must be addressed, especially as Wamu keeps growing and the OTS
keeps shrinking.
The OTS unvei l ed a re s tru ctu ring plan in April 2002 to en a ble it to remain an
i n depen dent agen c y.This invo lved a 20 percent staff c ut to abo ut 930 em p l oy-
ee s , with com p l i a n ce ex a m i n ers being redu ced at more than three times the
ra te of those for safety and soundness. Si gn i f i c a n t ly, the OTS el i m i n a ted sep-
a ra te com p l i a n ce exams and ex a m i n ers .In a stunning ch a n ge in bank reg u l a-
tory po l i c y, the OTS call ed for thrifts to con du ct a sel f - eva lu a ti on of t h ei r
com p l i a n ce  before  ex a m i n ers  arrived  for  the  new  con s o l i d a ted  ex a m , a n
a pproach it cl a i m ed would “p l ace em phasis on insti tuti on s , not the reg u l a tor,
to en su re com p l i a n ce with all ex i s ting laws , i n cluding con su m er pro tecti on
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s t a tute s” ( Hell er 2002). The latter statutes inclu de the CRA and abo ut 25
o t h er laws su ch as Trut h - i n - Len d i n g,Trut h - i n - Savi n gs , and many more .
This OTS statement, in addition to being what Congressman John LaFalce
of New York called a “complete abrogation of the mandate your agency has
been given by Congress” (Heller 2002), is nothing less than a breakdown
of the CRA Triangle. This is also the best justification yet for why this 
desperately struggling agency, like the troubled thrifts it used to regulate,
should be merged into the OCC or perhaps made a division within it.
Mutual institutions and other specialized thrift lenders regulated by the OTS
would continue to coexist with their stock-based counterparts.
The only thing worse than a compliance self-evaluation is no compliance law
at all, which was the case prior to 1977 for CRA. Moreover, past experience
has shown that CRA is best monitored and enforced with specialized com-
pliance examiners and separate exams. Specialized CRA examiners first
existed at the Fed in 1977 with the passage of that law. The other agencies,
which operate under tighter budgetary restrictions than the money-creating
Fed, did not follow until and after 1989, CRA’s watershed year. The OTS
developed its specialized compliance program in 1989.It was followed by the
FDIC in 1991 and the OCC a few years later.
A com p a ri s on of C RA ra ti n gs for the 15-month peri od both before and after
the cre a ti on of the OTS spec i a l i zed com p l i a n ce functi on shows dra m a tic re su l t s
(Th omas 1993). Th ere  was a ro u gh ly sixfold increase in the percen t a ge of
bel ow - avera ge ra ti n gs , f rom 3.7 percent to 22.5 percen t . The com p a ra ble pro-
porti on of a bove - avera ge ra ti n gs dec re a s ed from 11.3 percent to 9.4 percen t .
The differen ces were even more dra m a tic fo ll owing the initial “tra n s i ti on”
qu a rter under the new sys tem : bel ow- and above - avera ge ra ti n gs for the 12
m onths after the ch a n ge were 25.0 percent and 2.5 percen t , re s pectively.
This would mean a nearly seven fold increase in bel ow - avera ge and nearly
f ivefold dec rease in above - avera ge ra ti n gs . This evi den ce ,a l t h o u gh for on ly
one of the four federal reg u l a tors , su ggests that the use of s pec i a l i zed com-
p l i a n ce ex a m i n a ti on re sults in mu ch stri cter en forcem ent of C RA , def i n ed
in terms of a gre a ter percen t a ge of bel ow - avera ge and a lesser percen t a ge of
a bove - avera ge ra ti n gs .
Ba s ed on this ex peri en ce , the recent shift by both the FDIC and OTS aw ay
f rom spec i a l i zed com p l i a n ce ex a m i n ers and exams may re sult in the oppo s i te
The Levy Economics Institute o f Bard Collegeef fect , n a m ely,less stri ct en forcem ent of C RA .This is most likely to be the case
with the OTS ,with its planned sel f - eva lu a ti on form a t ,wh ere the em phasis wi ll
be on the insti tuti on s , not the reg u l a tors , to en su re reg u l a tory com p l i a n ce .
Le s s - s tri ct en forcem ent of C RA is not good public po l i c y,e s pec i a lly in a grade -
i n f l a ti on a ry envi ron m en t .
The  FDIC  and  espec i a lly  the  OTS  com p l i a n ce  con s o l i d a ti ons  su ggest  that 
it may be time to revisit the proposal (see Ta bles 2 and 3) to con s o l i d a te the
com p l i a n ce functi on of a ll four reg u l a tors into an FFIEC-style “su per- reg u l a tor ”
for com p l i a n ce . This would be similar to past proposals to cre a te an inde-
pen dent su per- reg u l a tor for safety and soundness purposes (Th omas 1994).
Other Key Reform Issues
Community groups are correct in asking for a fix to the rampant grade infla-
tion problem, more credit for originated as opposed to purchased loans, a
fifth High Satisfactory overall rating, repeal of the longer 1999 Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act (GLB) exam cycles, and an expansion of CRA, at least to
credit unions. This latter recommendation is important, as the proportion
of home purchase loans made by CRA-covered institutions continues to fall,
with less than 30 percent of home purchase mortgages being subject to
intensive CRA review (“25th”2002).
Many of the CRA reforms championed by community groups are found 
in the proposed CRA Modernization Act of 2001. The NCRC takes credit 
for being the “lead organization” for the introduction of this proposed
legislation (NCRC 2002).Its congressional sponsors are essentially the same
members who signed a boilerplate “NCRC Sample Letter on the CRA
ANPR,” which was reprinted on October 16, 2001 on congressional letter-
head and submitted to regulators as a CRA reform comment. This legisla-
tion would extend CRA to insurance companies, securities firms, and
holding company affiliates.It also contains CRA rating penalties for institu-
tions engaging in predatory lending, a fifth overall High Satisfactory rating,
a repeal of the longer CRA exam cycles of GLB, and additional data collec-
tion and reporting requirements.Among its most controversial portions are
an effort to make CRA a race-based law and a repeal of the GLB “sunshine”
requirements regarding the disclosure of CRA agreements between banks
and community groups. For these and other reasons, there is little chance
that this proposal will be enacted into law.
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Conclusion
CRA’s success has been in its simplicity, something somewhat forgotten
during the 1993–95 reform process with the creation of separate investment
and service tests on top of the lending ones. Good public policy in CRA
must be focused on LMI lending, the purpose of the 1977 law. As was the
case with the last reform proce s s , bank reg u l a tors , Con gre s s , and the Bu s h
Ad m i n i stration will, ideally, see to it that the ongoing dynamic tension
between industry and community interests results in balanced reforms.
It is more important than ever that this public policy deliberation be con-
ducted with a full view of the potential conflicts and constraints of each of
the corners of the CRA Triangle as described above.Many of these issues did
not exist during the last reform process, but they are most relevant today.
It is respectfully suggested that the reform recommendations in Table 6,
especially the streamlined large retail bank exam, are optimal in the sense
that they represent an objective, balanced perspective of both community
and industry interests with full recognition of all relevant conflicts and 
constraints.Public Policy Brief 36
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Table 2 Comparison of Old and “New”CRA Proposals and Final 1995 Regulations
“Old”CRA Regulations
One test with 12 assessment factors applies to all
institutions
No streamlined assessment method for smaller
institutions
No separate test for large retail institutions
No separate test for wholesale and limited-purpose
institutions
No alternative assessment methods
Determination of overall rating is subjective
without any weighting of assessment factors
Institutions assessed on their method of delineating
the “l ocal com mu n i ty.”The “del i n e a ted com mu n i ty ”
is defined as the contiguous area surrounding each
office or group of offices.
December 1993 Proposal
Separate tests for small and large retail institutions
Independent banks and thrifts with total assets 
of under $250 million or members of a holding
company with total banking and thrifts assets of
less than $250 million could be evaluated under
streamlined procedures,if eligible. Under the
lending test,a 60 percent loan-to-deposit ratio 
and a good loan mix,among other things,
would be presumed Satisfactory.
Three assessment tests—lending, investment,and
service—for all large retail institutions
Wholesale and limited-purpose institutions 
evaluated primarily under the investment test
Institutions could elect evaluation based on a 
preapproved two-year strategic plan developed
by the bank or thrift with input from the local
community
For retail institutions,the rating under the lending
test would form the basis for the composite rating;
the rating could then be increased or decreased
based on extraordinarily weak or strong perform-
ance under the service and investment tests
Geographic area around each office or group of
offices where an institution makes the bulk of
its loans would define its “service area.”Service
area must be broad enough to include low- and
moderate-income (LMI) areas. Institutions provid-
ing services in multiple metropolitan statistical
areas (MSAs) or across state lines would have sepa-
rate service areas for each market.
Source: The CRA Handbo ok(McGraw-Hill,1998).The Levy Economics Institute o f Bard College 37
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September 1994 Proposal
Separate tests for small and large retail as well as
wholesale and limited-purpose institutions
The streamlined assessment method would be used
for evaluating small institutions,unless the bank or
thrift requests an alternative assessment method or
is operating under an approved strategic plan. The
l oan mix and 60 percent loa n - to - deposit pre su m ptive
ra tio for a Sa ti s f actory ra ting would be el i m i n a ted .
Three assessment tests—lending, investment,and
service—for all large retail institutions
Wholesale and limited - p u rpose insti tuti ons eva lu a ted
pri m a ri ly under a new com mu n i ty devel opm ent te s t
Strategic plan option is revised to provide greater
clarification of plan development process, provi-
sions for community input,approval standards,and
goal specifications. Maximum plan term is length-
ened to five years, with annual interim. Measurable
goals required.Plan amendment procedures are
included.
A retail insti tuti on must be ra ted Sa ti s f actory or 
bet ter under the lending test to receive an overa ll 
ra ting of s a ti s f actory. The ef fect of the servi ce and
i nve s tm ent test on the overa ll ra ting would no lon ger
be limited to situ a ti ons wh ere servi ce or inve s tm en t
perform a n ce is ex tra ord i n a ri ly weak or stron g.
The “service area”of a retail institution would have
to include the local areas around its deposit taking
facilities in which it has originated or has outstand-
ing a significant number of loans and all other areas
equidistant from those facilities. Service areas must
include entire census tracts and block numbering
areas. The LMI requirement is removed. Institutions
not assessed on method of service area delineation.
May 1995 Final “New”CRA Regulations
Separate tests for small and large retail as well as
wholesale and limited-purpose institutions
Independent banks and thrifts with total assets of
under $250 million or members of a holding com-
p a ny with total banking and thrift assets of less than
$1 billion would be evaluated under streamlined
procedures,if eligible. The streamlined method
would be used for evaluating small institutions,
unless they request an altern a tive assessment met h od
or are operating under an approved strategic plan.
Three assessment tests—lending, investment,and
service—for all large retail institutions
Wholesale and limited - p u rpose insti tuti ons eva lu a ted
pri m a ri ly under a new com mu n i ty devel opm ent te s t
Strategic plan option is retained. Institutions
required to describe informal efforts to seek public
suggestions. Institutions may elect alternative
assessment method if it fails to meet substantially
its planned goals for a Satisfactory rating.
A retail institution must be rated Low Satisfactory
or better under the lending test to receive an overall
rating of Satisfactory. The effect of the service and
investment tests on the overall rating is not limited
to situations where service or investment perform-
ance is extraordinarily weak or strong.
The “assessment area”of a retail institution would
have to include the local areas around its deposit
taking facilities in which it has originated or
purchased a substantial portion of its loans.
Assessment areas must consist generally of one 
or more MSAs or contiguous political subdivisions
and must include full census tracts and block
numbering areas. Institutions not assessed on
method of assessment area delineation.
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Table 2 Comparison of Old and “New”CRA Proposals (Continued)
“Old”CRA Regulations
No market share provisions
Institutions are required to prepare lengthy CRA
statements by an actively participating board and
prepare documentation of meetings,marketing,
outreach,and credit needs ascertainment efforts
Enforcement tools limited to denial or conditioning
of corporate applications filed by institutions with
poor CRA performance or substantial unresolved
CRA protests
No publication of scheduled CRA exams
No race or gender data collected for consumer,
small business, or small farm loans
No data collected and reported on the geographic
distribution of loans or the race, ethnicity and 
gender of borrowers,other than data on mortgages
reported pursuant to the Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act (HMDA)
December 1993 Proposal
A “m a rket share screen”u n der the lending test wo u l d
establish a rebuttable presumption that an institu-
tion’s CRA performance was at a certain level based
on market share of loans in middle-income and
upper-income areas compared to market share of
loans in lower-income and moderate-income areas.
Emphasis is placed on performance over process—
institutions would no longer be required to devote
resources to“documenting the files”
In ad d i ti on to taking CRA perform a n ce into acco u n t
when acting on applications, regulators would
en force CRA com p l i a n ce in the same manner as 
a ny other regulation and could impose formal
enforcement actions for Substantial Noncompliance
ratings (which would be automatic upon the third
consecutive Needs to Improve or lower rating)
Bank regulators required to publish quarterly
scheduled CRA exams
No race or gender data collected for consumer,
small business, or small farm loans
Large banks and thrifts would be required to collect
and report data on the geographic distribution of
housing, consumer, small business,and farm loans,
and on loan applications, denials, originations,
purchases,sales,and retirements. They would 
also report data on the size of the businesses to
which loans were made.These new reporting
requirements would be in addition to existing
HMDA reporting requirements and Call Report
requirements for small business and farm loans.The Levy Economics Institute o f Bard College 39
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September 1994 Proposal
Explicit market share language has been eliminated
from the regulation. Market share analysis is one 
of a broad variety of comparisons that examiners
would use where appropriate in evaluating 
performance under the lending test.
Emphasis would remain on performance over
process
In ad d i ti on to taking CRA perform a n ce into acco u n t
when acting on applications, regulators would
enforce CRA compliance in the same manner as any
other regulation and could impose formal enforce-
ment actions for Substantial Noncompliance
ratings (which would be automatic upon the third
consecutive Needs to Improve or lower rating)
Quarterly published lists of scheduled CRA exams
retained
Large banks and thrifts would have to collect race,
ethnicity and gender data on small business and
small farm loans
Agencies would base their analysis of mortgages
lending on the data already reported under HMDA.
However, large institutions reporting under HMDA,
as well as small institutions who elect evaluation
under the lending, investment,and service tests,
would also be required to report data on home
mortgage loans made outside of MSAs.Large banks
and thrifts would collect and report certain data 
on the geographic distribution of and the race,
ethnicity, and gender of small business and small
farm borrowers who have loans that are currently
aggregated on bank Call Reports. Some data would
be reported by loan size and would include an 
indication of whether the business or farm had gross
annual revenues of more or less than $1 million.
Aggregate data on small business and small farm
loans and community development loans would be
included in an institution’s Public file. The agencies
would not make any aggregate data available to
the public.
May 1995 Final “New”CRA Regulations
Explicit market share language has been eliminated
from the regulation. Market share analysis is one 
of a broad variety of comparisons that examiners
would use where appropriate in evaluating 
performance under the lending test.
Emphasis would remain on performance over
process
December 1994 Department of Justice opinion
prevents imposition of formal enforcement actions.
Consequently, en forcem ent tools limited to den i a l
or con d i ti on i n g of corporate applications filed
by institutions with poor CRA performance.
Automatic downgrading of third Needs to Improve
rating eliminated.
Quarterly published lists of scheduled CRA exams
retained
No race or gender data collected for consumer,
small business, or small farm loans
Agencies would base their analysis of mortgage
l ending on the data alre ady reported under HMDA .
However, large institutions reporting under
HMDA,as well as small institutions who elect
evaluation under the lending, investment and 
service tests, would also be required to report data
on home mortgage loans made outside of MSAs.
Large banks and thrifts (and small ones that elect
such evaluation) must collect and report certain
data on the geographic distribution of small busi-
ness and small farm borrowers. These data must 
be reported by loan size and include an indication
of whether the business or farm had gross annual
revenues of more or less than $1 million. The agen-
cies rather than institutions will prepare annual and
business loan data by geography for each reporting
institution and aggregate statements for each MSA
and the non-MSA portion of each state. Although
there are no reporting requirements for consumer
lending, an institution with a substantial majority
of its business of this type will have such lending
evaluated under the lending test.Public Policy Brief 40
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I,J:Origination of loans and
participation in government 
loan programs
E :G eogra phic distri buti on of l oa n s
H: Participation and investments
in CD projects
Assessment Factor






Percentage loans in AA
Borrower distribution by income
and business/farm size in AA
Geographic distribution of loans
in AA
Optional Investment Test to
Upgrade“Satisfactory”Rating
Investment record enhances
credit availability in AA
Large Retail Bank Test
Lending Test
Lending activity levels responsive
to AA credit needs
Percentage loans in AA
Borrower distribution by income
and business/farm size in AA
Geographic distribution of loans
in AA
Lending to highly economically
disadvantaged geographies and
low income people and very small
businesses in AA




Amount of qualified CD
investments and grants
Use of innovative and/or complex
qualified investments to support
CD
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Responsiveness to credit and
community economic develop-
ment needs in AA
Level of CD lending*
Use of innovative or complex CD
loans*
CD Investments
Level of qualified investments*
Use of innovative or complex
qualified investments*
Responsiveness to credit and
community economic develop-
ment needs in AA; agencies
would not make any aggregate
data available to the public
Strategic Plan Test 
Lending Goals
Measurable goals for helping to
meet AA credit needs,particularly
those of LMI geographies and
individuals.Goals must be
responsive to AA characteristics;
public comments;and the bank’s




goals that are responsive to AA
characteristics and credit needs,
particularly those of LMI
geographies and individuals;
public comments;and the bank’s









G: Record of providing services at
offices
H: Participation and investments
in CD projects
D: Practices intended to
discourage loan applications
F: Prohibited discrimination or
other illegal practices
L: Other factors regarding credit
needs




B: Marketing and special programs
to enhance credit awareness
C: Board of directors’participation
Reasonableness of delineated
community evaluated as “13th”
assessment factor
La rge Retail Bank Te s t
Service Test
Service Test
Accessibility of delivery systems
to all portions of the AA
Record of opening and closing
offices
Reasonableness of business hours
and services in AA
Level of CD services
Practices reviewed but not rated
Practices reviewed but not rated








Assessment Factor not reviewed
or rated
Re a s on a bl eness of del i n e a ted
a s s e s s m ent area not eva lu a ted as
s ep a ra te perform a n ce cri teri on but
must meet stated requ i rem en t s
Table 3 Comparison of“Old”and “New”CRA Assessment Factors and
Performance Standards  (Continued)
“Old”CRA
Small Bank Test
Optional Service Test to
Upgrade“Satisfactory”Rating
Record of providing delivery
systems and other services
enhances credit availability in AA
Practices reviewed but not rated
Practices reviewed but not rated








Assessment Factor not reviewed
or rated
Re a s on a bl eness of del i n e a ted
a s s e s s m ent area not eva lu a ted as
s ep a ra te perform a n ce cri teri on but
must meet stated requ i rem en t s
“New”CRA
Service Test
Miscellaneous TestsThe Levy Economics Institute o f Bard College 43
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Level of CD services*
Use of innovative or complex CD
services*
Practices reviewed but not rated
Practices reviewed but not rated








Assessment Factor not reviewed
or rated
Re a s on a bl eness of del i n e a ted
a s s e s s m ent area not eva lu a ted as
s ep a ra te perform a n ce cri teri on but
must meet stated requ i rem en t s
Strategic Plan Test 
Service Goals
Preferably measurable service
goals that are responsive to AA
characteristics and credit needs,
particularly those of LMI
geographies and individuals;
public comments;and the bank’s
capacity and constraints, product
offerings and business strategy.
Practices reviewed but not rated
Practices reviewed but not rated








Assessment Factor not reviewed
or rated
Re a s on a bl eness of del i n e a ted
a s s e s s m ent area not eva lu a ted as
s ep a ra te perform a n ce cri teri on but
must meet stated requ i rem en t s
Miscellaneous Tests
Service Test
* Part of one performance standardPublic Policy Brief 44
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L a r ge bank exam has incre a s ed
com p l i a n ce bu rden ; do not requ i re
banks to dem on s tra te that som e
C RA activi ties have been “ i n n ova-
tive”or “com p l ex ” ;a n nual revi ew
of C RA ra ti n gs for more con s i s-
tency among agen c i e s ;PE should
cl e a rly show date exam began and
en ded as well as revi ew peri od
More examiner training and
guidance;need incentives to
achieve higher ratings
Inconsistency and uncertainty of
CRA exams and ratings across
agencies and elsewhere require
examiner training and better pre-
exam communications;innova-
tive and complex CRA activities
should not be required for
Outstanding rating
Incentives for Outstanding rating
such as streamlined CRA exam or
application review; overemphasis
on quantitative measures causes
very good but smaller projects to
be overlooked
Lending Test
Treat originations and purchases
identically; keep predatory lend-
ing issues as part of fair lending
exam rather than CRA exam
Grant same weight to purchased
loans as originated ones
L a r ge bank exam should be pri-
m a ri ly based on qu a l i f ying loa n s
with the opti on of i nve s tm ent or
s ervi ce activi ty;maintain credit for
ori gi n a ti ons as well as purch a s e s ;
do not inclu de pred a tory len d i n g
con cerns in PE as they should be
covered in fair lending ex a m .
Less quantitative emphasis,
especially in areas with limited
CRA product; better developed
benchmarks in evaluations;
review lending for harmful or
abusive practices in context of
fair lending exam;letters of credit
should count equally as loans;
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Investment Test
Eliminate and make investments
substitutable for loans; return
focus of CRA to credit rather
than CD and investments;invest-
ment test is #1 CRA problem for
large banks; qualified investments
are limited, expensive with “CRA
premium,” and create documen-
tation burden; investment test not
authorized by CRA; no statutory
authority for this test
Must be eliminated, revised, or its
relative importance reduced or
even made optional for “extra
credit”;ignores type of invest-
ment by giving more credit to
easy investment vs.partnering
with community group
Remove as required test; expand
scope of qualified investments
Ineffective and often problematic;
combine with lending test or
replace with CD test; greater
recognition of credit for written-
off equity investments
Service Test
Depends too heavily on branches;
broader definition of service to
include LMI financial education
and nontraditional banking;no
statutory authority for this test
Largely been effective but needs
updating for alternative delivery




No need for separate test;
expand definition of CD activities
to include all revitalization and 
stabilization activities, regardless
of location
More inclusive definition of CD;
expand double-counting of
affordable multifamily lending
under both HMDA and CD
Large Retail Institutions:The Lending,Service,and Investment Tests
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No major rewrite;more incen-
tives if get Outstanding rating;
greater agency consistency;
greater opportunity to shift
among investment,lending, and
service tests to meet local needs
Member companies split, but
most see no need for major
reform but only“tweaking”;
more flexibility during exams 
and less emphasis on requiring
“innovative”and “complex”
activities 
More detailed examiner guidance
on qualitative factors
Better exam procedures and
training;public file only available
at main office; address industry
perception that Outstanding rat-
ing is out of reach for small banks
Lending and service tests are
paramount; investment test
should be secondary,optional,
and sometimes unnecessary; only
use innovative and complex crite-
ria to improve rating
Lending Test
Equal treatment of purchases 
and originations; consistent 
consideration of letters of credit
No change to current treatment
of purchases vs. originations;
consideration of letters of credit;
consideration of “harmful”and
“abusive”lending practices too
subjective and would be very
difficult and counterproductive
Keep at 50 percent;include letters
of credit for CD loans
Prefer identical treatment of
purchased and originated loans,
but possible discounting of
purchased loans far outside AA
Ma ke more flex i ble and less rel i a n t
on qu a n ti t a tive measu re s ; do not
requ i re CD inve s tm ents and serv-
i ces to get a Sa ti s f actory ra ti n g
Large Retail Institutions:
The Lending, Service,and
Investment TestsThe Levy Economics Institute o f Bard College 47
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Investment Test
Limited number of investments,
and heavy competition for them
results in low returns;many
investments essentially become
grants;unrealistic expectations
and ultimately too costly
Several mem bers favor el i m i n a ti on
of test or at least su b suming in
Lending Test so inve s tm ents su b s ti-
tut a ble for loa n s ;s ome mem bers
would like all three tests co u n ted
equ a lly;recom m ends ch oi ce be -
t ween ex i s ting sys tem and a mod i f i ed
CD test that all ows more flex i bi l i ty
Eliminate;limited number of
investments with pricing prob-
lems; considerable overlap with
CD loans; evaluate as part of new
CD test
Less em phasis on inve s tm ents and
m ore on loa n s ; one recom m en ded
s o luti on is el i m i n a ti on of i nve s t-
m ent test and making it opti on a l
for ex tra cred i t ;c redit for inve s t-
m ents out s i de of A A ; expand 
qu a l i f i ed inve s tm ents to inclu de
municipal devel opm ent bon d s
Eliminate as required benchmark
and make use and weighting of it
at discretion of bank
Make optional and count invest-
ments for extra credit or as a sub-
stitute for loans; expand scope of
qualified investments
Service Test
More weight to alternative deliv-
ery channels besides branches
Credit for ATMs used by LMI
people;more consideration for
flexible and innovative deposit
accounts
Reduce to 20 percent
Consider alternative delivery
systems such as the internet and
special purpose deposit accounts;
credit for CD services even if not
financially related
Count services for extra credit or
as a substitute for loans
Community Development (CD)
Activities
Credit for more activities,even
non–LMI related;credit for
non–AA CD activities if meet
AA needs
New test at 30 percent
Better definition of CD activities;
credit for any economic develop-
ment activity,even if not LMI
related
Restrict CD concept to invest-
ments rather than loans or
services
Broaden scope of CD investments
and services to benefit entire
community, not just LMI areas
Large Retail Institutions:The Lending,Service,and Investment Tests
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test; increase independent small
bank size minimum to $1 billion;
remove holding company defini-
tion
Increase in size definition of
small independents to $1 billion
and holding companies to $5 
billion in assets is most important
reform proposal
Raise small bank cutoff to $1 
billion in assets
Top priority is increase in size
of small independent banks to
at least $1 billion in assets and
preferably $2 billion; prefer
eliminating holding company
minimum, but otherwise $5 
billion minimum 
Limited Purpose (LP) and
Wholesale Institutions:The
Community Development Test
Greater flexibility in definition of
special purpose banks so more
banks can use this test; consider
this flexible test for retail banks;
more liberal consideration of
qualified investments;credit for
nonlocal CD activities
Should be option for large retail
institutions
Greater flexibility in definition of
special purpose banks
Broader definitions to include
those with alternative,
non–branch delivery systemsThe Levy Economics Institute o f Bard College 49
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Strategic Plan
Retain this option for flexibility;
only community groups within
AA should have standing to com-
ment on plan;more consistent
treatment among regions
Maintain it as flexible alternative
for nontraditional banks like
internet ones; promote more at
regional or local level
Current process arduous and
related risks too great
Performance Context (PC)
Examiners must provide banks
with more information on PC,
including peer comparisons and
possibly mandatory pre-exam
consultations
Competition must be more realis-
tically considered; examiners
must provide specific quantifiable
goals
Examiner must obtain bank’s
concurrence on elements of PC 
as early as possible
Has not been effectively used,
especially when excess competi-
tion for limited CRA product;
must be more consistent among
agencies; components of PC
should be shared with bank to
create a dialog
More and better use
Must be given more con s i dera ti on
More fully shared with 
banks before and during exam;




flexibility to designate larger
AAs to include states and regions
rather than just MSAs
Separate AA designation for
internet banks; credit for loans
and investments outside AA as
long as AA needs met
Examiners do not question bank’s
designation of AA
Current approach is sufficient
and reasonable
Credit for lending outside AA if
meet needs within; delineate AAs
around deposit facilities only
Most members feel no need to
change,but some want more
flexibility if don’t use branches
Credit for all activities outside
of AA as long as adequately met
needs within AA
Maintain current approach with
greater latitude to designate LMI
areas
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Extend small bank designation to
assets of $1 billion or less
Limited Purpose (LP) and
Wholesale Institutions:The
Community Development Test
Make easier to qualify as LP 
institution by eliminating
requirement of offering credit
cards or car loans exclusivelyThe Levy Economics Institute o f Bard College 51
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Strategic Plan
Make easier to apply for and
modify
Performance Context (PC) Assessment Area (AA)
AA concept is neither useful 
nor practical and increasingly
irrelevant;CRA credit for LMI
loans anywhere in state, regard-
less of AA;flexibility to designate
regional or statewide AAs
Continue definition based on
area around offices; exclude areas
where bank has no presence
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Maintain current approach as
being consistent with statute
Retain current approach
Maintain current approach for
flexibility
Maintain flexibility of current
approach
Data Collection and
Maintenance of Public Files
End current data collection
requirements or apply only
to banks with 250 or more
reportable loans;strongly
opposes any more data 
collection or reporting;current
small business and farm lending
data collection and reporting
inconsistent with CRA
Data collecting and maintaining
public files are a burden; not con-
vinced collected data are useful
Streamlined data requirements
for banks making a small number
of covered loans
No changes to data collection;
systems in place and function
well;public file only at main
office since minimal requests 
(five or less per year) and long PE
(450 pages)
Agencies badly underestimate
compliance cost and time, but




burdensome and data of minimal
use; eliminate current data collec-
tion requirements; strongly
oppose any new requirements;
make public file available at just
one central location
Current data collection and
reporting is huge burden and
expensive undertaking but
effective;no additional 
requirements neededThe Levy Economics Institute o f Bard College 53
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Source of Comment
Independent Community





Activities of Affiliates Data Collection and
Maintenance of Public Files
Eliminate since costs cannot jus-
tify benefits
Strongly oppose any new require-
ments; existing requirements,
except for HMDA,should be
optional; existing CRA data of
little value
Discontinue CRA reporting of
small business loans; reports of
little value and extremely costlyPublic Policy Brief 54
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Upgrade ra ti n gs standards to
redu ce grade inflati on
Fifth Hi gh Sa ti s f actory overa ll 
ra ti n g ; Low Sa ti s f actory banks
must su bmit public improvem en t
p l a n ; use qu a l i t a tive factors on ly
to improve Sa ti s f actory ra ti n g ;
revise CRA to focus on race as
well as incom e
Too mu ch em phasis on perform-
a n ce of l a r ge banks in urb a n
cen ters vs . ru ral are a s ;i n c re a s ed
use of com mu n i ty group con t act s
du ring ex a m s
Con du ct CRA ,fair len d i n g, a n d
s a fety and soundness exams 
con c u rren t ly;i n cen tives to incre a s e
prime len d i n g ;don't provi de
excess credit for “ i n n ova tive”
progra m s ; fifth overa ll Hi gh
Sa ti s f actory ra ti n g ; Low
Sa ti s f actory or lower ra ti n g
requ i res improvem ent plan wi t h
p u blic com m ent peri od ;a pp ly
Gra m m - Le ach - Bl i l ey Act re s tri c-
ti on that all banks with failing 
ra ti n gs cannot expand into the
s ec u ri ties or insu ra n ce business 
to both acqu i ring and acqu i red
b a n k s ;p u blic heari n gs on any 
propo s ed CRA reform s
Lending Test
Consider quality as well as quan-
ti ty of l oa n s ; pen a l i ze len ders wi t h
originated or purchased loans
with abusive or predatory terms;
evaluate pricing to make sure
prime borrowers do not have su b-
prime rates or terms; count pur-
chases mu ch less than ori gi n a ti on s
Credit for multifamily lending in
low income areas only if to LMI
tenants;no loan should count
more than once; penalize any
predatory or payday lending;little
to no credit for subprime lending
Credit to move subprime borrow-
ers to prime market; deny CRA
credit for any predatory loans
Evaluate subprime lending;
consider minorities in exam like
LMI borrowers;purchased loans
not counted as much as origi-
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Investment Test
Maintain;more weight to grants;
no credit for MBS with underly-
ing predatory features
Maintain test;loan purchases get
credit only under Investment Test;
most credit for contributions and
less credit for MBS 
Maintain 
Service Test
Maintain; quantify use of
low-cost banking services such as
lifeline banking accounts;banks
partnering with check cashers
or payday lenders receive below
satisfactory rating on Service Test
Consider fees in service test;
better description of CD services
in PE; banks must provide lifeline
banking products
Maintain but increase quantita-
tive analysis and rigor
Di s cl o su re of ch ecking and savi n gs
accounts with fee inform a ti on
Community Development (CD)
Activities
Opposed to separate CD test
Include race as factor in defining
CD;no credit for CD services
outside of AA
Do not develop separate CD test;
limit CRA credit to LMI activities
Large Retail Institutions:The Lending,Service,and Investment Tests
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Con du ct CRA ,fair len d i n g,a n d
s a fety and soundness exams con-
c u rren t ly; em phasis on qu a n ti t a-
tive cri teri a ;" i n n ova tive" progra m s
do not com pen s a te for otherwi s e
b ad perform a n ce ;fifth Hi gh
Sa ti s f actory overa ll ra ti n g ; Low
Sa ti s f actory banks must su bm i t
p u blic improvem ent plan; G L B
ex p a n s i on re s tri cti on due to poor
C RA ra ti n gs applies to both banks
in a de a l ;p u blic heari n gs to discuss
C RA reform
In clu de insu ra n ce com p a ny activi-
ties rel a ted to covered banking activ-
i ti e s ; add Hi gh Sa ti s f actory overa ll
ra ti n g ; give out more Needs to
Im prove ra ti n gs ;rew a rd leaders h i p
ef forts by banks; p u blic heari n gs
for all mer gers of $1 bi ll i on or more
in assets if ei t h er party has Bel ow
Avera ge com pon ent test ra ting 
Add fifth overa ll ra ting of Hi gh
Sa ti s f actory; overa ll ra ti n gs of Low
Sa ti s f actory or less requ i re publ i c
i m provem ent plan with com m en t
peri od ;s tren g t h en CRA en force-
m en t ; ad d i ti onal prom pt discl o-
su re of C RA appe a l s ; em ph a s i ze
qu a n ti t a tive approach ; con du ct
C RA ,fair len d i n g,and safety and
soundness exams con c u rren t ly
Use qu a l i t a tive factors on ly to
u pgrade bank if Hi gh Sa ti s f actory
ra ti n g ;O utstanding ra ting den i ed
i f bank ra ted Needs to Im prove on
a ny com pon ent te s t ; Sa ti s f actory
ra ting on ly if no Su b s t a n ti a l
Non com p l i a n ce ra ting in any 
com pon ent te s t
Lending Test
Penalize lenders for making
predatory loans; subprime
lenders must show that no credit-
worthy borrower was offered sub-
prime loan;purchased loans not
given same weight as originated
ones
Subprime lending does not count
as much as prime lending;severe
penalties for any predatory lend-
ing; explicit consideration of
minorities just like LMI people
and areas
Qualitative analysis of lending for
costs and abusive terms; consider
number of loans besides amount;
originations given more weight
than purchases;include neighbor-
hood race data in geographic dis-
tribution; penalty for predatory
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Investment Test
Maintain as there is a need for
equity investments in LMI areas
Bonus credits for key grants
Needed since LMI areas have
shortage of equity investments 
for small businesses; quantitative
benchmark such as ratio of CD
investments to assets;also use
ratio of nonprofit grants to assets;
more credit to investments with
better LMI impact
Maintain;distinguish between
low- and high-risk investments;
measure bank grants relative to
bank earnings; review invest-
ments for underlying predatory
features
Service Test
Data on number of checking 
and savings accounts by income
and minority status and location;
include fees and cost of deposit
services;CRA credit for afford-
able services to LMI areas
Must be more ri gorous due to
grade inflati on ; requ i re new data
on savi n gs and ch ecking acco u n t s ;
requ i re bra n ch distri buti on data
in PE s ;i n clu de data on cost of
s ervi ce s ; no credit for payd ay
l en d i n g ; on ly all ow credit for
a l tern a tive del ivery sys tems or CD
s ervi ces if i m p act LMI borrowers
Maintain; quantify use of
low-cost banking services such as 
lifeline banking accounts;banks
partnering with check cashers
or payday lenders receive Below
Satisfactory rating on Service
Test; require more quantitative
measures of alternative services
Community Development (CD)
Activities
Banks have discretion to consider
CD loans as qualified investments
without securitizing them;no
expansion of credit for CD 
activities outside of broader
regional or statewide area 
including AA
Do not make separate test; count
CD credit under Investment or
Lending Tests; narrow current 
CD definition to focus on LMI
and race
Large Retail Institutions:The Lending,Service,and Investment Tests
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Add fifth overa ll ra ting of Hi gh
Sa ti s f actory
To u gh er overa ll ra ting requ i re-
m ents based on com pon ent te s t
ra ti n gs
Lending Test
Focus more on quality rather
than quantity of lending, espe-
cially as related to predatory
loans; bonus credit for low-cost
alternatives to payday lending
More weight for originations vs.
purchases;include race as well as
income criteria; evaluate quality
as well as quantity of lending;
examine subprime lending for
predatory features, which result
in low rating; evaluate all home-
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Investment Test
Increase weighting in certain
c a s e s ; en co u ra ge su b s t a n tive gra n t s
or investments in nonprofits
Minimum Low Satisfactory rating
on this test for overall passing
rating;distinguish investments
based on risk and return; review
MBS for underlying predatory
features
Service Test
Evaluate whether retail banking
services easily accessible by LMI
people and areas
Minimum Low Satisfactory rating
on this test for overall passing
rating; consider distribution
of bank accounts by income,
race,and geography; Outstanding 
rating on this test requires lifeline
banking, multiple delivery
systems, or account alternatives 
as well as innovative and complex
services;internet or trust banks




More restrictive CD definition
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Maintain existing size require-
ments; require Service Test for all
small banks; require CD lending
and investments for Outstanding
rating for banks in $100–250 mil-
lion range
Maintain existing size require-
ments;more detailed perform-
ance data should be in PE;
tougher loan to deposit 
standards in rural areas
Maintain existing size require-
ments;more detailed data
requirements and analysis;
require Investment and Service
Tests for small banks
Do not allow any more banks 
to qualify for this test;make
optional Investment and 
Service Tests mandatory; propose 
minimum 75 percent loan-to-
deposit ratio for satisfactory
rating
Limited Purpose and Wholesale
Institutions:The Community
Development Test
Do not expand definition of
banks here; do not apply to other
banks
Too much discretion in designa-
tions; clearer standards required
Do not apply to retail banks
including branchless or internet
ones; tighten application
standards to avoid further
inappropriate qualifications The Levy Economics Institute o f Bard College 61
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Strategic Plan
Keep this option but increase
community input and review
Not an ef fective eva lu a ti on
m et h od ; ra rely used or con s i dered
Eliminate
Performance Context (PC)
Contact local groups and 
residents to ascertain community
needs
Examiners should make at least
20 community contacts per MSA
Include more information on PC
to make PEs more useful
Community outreach efforts 
by bank do not constitute
performance assessment
Regulators should inform
community groups of names of
banks when seeking public input;
regulators should also seek out
groups besides those recom-
mended by examined bank
Assessment Area (AA)
Include entire MSA;nontradi-
tional banks define AAs based
on substantial share of loans
(defined as 0.5 percent)
Banks that lend or take deposits
from a significant portion of
MSA market should have CRA
responsibilities there; compare
LMI to non-LMI aggregate
market share for internet and
insurance related banks
Require AA to include all areas
where substantial deposits or
loans
Must include communities in
which a great majority of bank
lending occurs
Examine those communities in
which a great majority of a bank's
loans are made
Must include communities in
which a great majority of bank
lending occurs; expand definition
to include areas where bank or
affiliates have branches, ATMs, or
more than 0.5 percent of loan
market (Continued)Public Policy Brief 62
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Drop loan-to-deposit ratio test
Maintain existing size
requirements
Limited Purpose and Wholesale
Institutions:The Community
Development Test
Current definitions inadequate as
some “special purpose” banks are
retail banks
More restrictive definitions to
qualify; bank is “retail”if more
than 0.5 percent market share of
any productThe Levy Economics Institute o f Bard College 63
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Strategic Plan
Not currently a viable alternative
and needs reform,if not
elimination
Greater specificity on CD plans




input;inform both banks and
community groups of PC in
advance of exam
Assessment Area (AA)
Penalize rating for banks involved
with payd ay len ders ,ch eck cashers ,
or other fringe financial services,
even if done outside AA;in addi-
tion to current definition,AA
should also include areas where
significant portion of deposits or
loans emanate
Internet and similar banks with
nontraditional delivery systems
should be evaluated on basis of
location of deposits and other
activities (e.g., define AA as all
MSAs where 5 percent or more of
deposits emanate) 
Expand by allowing banks to base
AA not just on branch locations
but also on location of significant
(0.5 percent or more market
share) portion of deposits or
loans
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Eliminate optional treatment of
affiliates
Include activities of all sub-
sidiaries and affiliates
Once a bank elects to  have any
affiliate's activity considered,then
the activity of all other affiliates
must be considered
Include activities of nondeposi-
tory affiliates
CRA exams should cover all
activities of nondepository
affiliates
Include activities of all sub-
sidiaries  and affiliates
Require all lending and banking
activities of nondepository bank
affiliates to be covered
Data Collection and
Maintenance of Public Files
Report current data quarterly
rather than annually; separate
data on prime vs. subprime mort-
gages; require HMDA-like small
business data
Require HMDA-like small busi-
ness data; report CD loan and
investment data by census tract
Report small business data in
HMDA format; report CD loans
on census tract basis;analyze
prime and subprime loans 
separately; report qualified
investments by category and
amount;improve access to
non-metro mortgage lending data
Supports Fed proposal to enhance
HMDA data to include APRs and
fees;lift Reg B prohibition on
reporting of race and gender
small business data; report
aggregated CD data by tract
HMDA analysis of lending to
minorities must be included;
supports Fed's proposed addition
of rate and fee data on HMDA
reports; race and gender data on
small business loans
CRA exams should not be color-
blind—include race and ethnic
data; examine and report diver-
sity of Board,managers,and key
CRA officers
Expand current requirements 
to include more detailed data;
supports Fed proposal to enhance
HMDA data to include APRs and
fees;lift Reg B prohibition on
reporting of race and gender
small business data; report
aggregated CD data by tractThe Levy Economics Institute o f Bard College 65
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All lending and banking activities
of nondepository affiliates must
be included in CRA exams
Review subprime and predatory
lending of affiliates in AA, with-
out expanding scope of CRA to
other nonregulated activities
Include affiliates' lending;at a
minimum,banks should “use all
or none”approach for affiliates
Data Collection and
Maintenance of Public Files
Report small business data in
HMDA format; report CD loans
on census tract basis;analyze
prime and subprime loans sepa-
rately; report qualified invest-
ments by category and amount;
improve access to non-metro
mortgage lending data
Better information on small
business lending, rural lending,
pricing, and fees; subprime vs.
predatory loan analysis
Maintain existing requirement
but make tougher; revise small
business reporting format to be
similar to HMDA; require race
and gender data for small
businesses;more detailed CD
lending data; require detailed
reporting for investments and
services;more detailed reporting
of existing CRA dataPublic Policy Brief 66
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17. Require all community groups and coalitions
involved with CRA to make sunshine filings dis-
closing details of all IRS Form 990 schedules
showing contributor names and amounts for
current and past years
18. More fact-based documentation of conclusions
in PE,including mandatory use of standardized
tables of performance data PEs that are as least
as comprehensive as those developed by the
OCC
19. All agencies should adopt all 10 recommenda-
tions to improve PEs found in the OTS Office of
Inspector General Report (see OIG 2001)
20. Greater CRA data availability and ease of access
(with optional e-mail notification list for specific
banks or areas) from FFIEC and agency websites
with announcement of upcoming exams, recent
ratings, related enforcement actions,reform
comments,FOIA requests and responses,appeal
files,special purpose bank designation applica-
tions, and GLB sunshine reports
21. More descriptive information in all PEs about
scope of exam,including starting and ending
dates,review period, products reviewed,AAs
covered,and even chief examiner's initials or
identifying number for accountability
22. Mandatory review and potential reform of CRA
five years after the complete transition to the
present reforms;if the reforms due out in 2002
are fully transitioned by the end of next year, the
next reform should occur in 2008
Public Policy Brief
Table 6 Optimal CRA Reform Recommendations
General Comments
1. Return focus of CRA exam and rating to LMI
lending
2. Reduction of grade inflation through joint
agency examiner education
3. Expansion of CRA to at least credit unions
4. More objective, quantitative,and structured PEs,
with excepti on of n ew qu a l i t a tive lending cri teri on
5. Goal of FFIEC centralized compliance function
6. Greater consistency in exam and rating proce-
dures among regulators and individual regions
7. Fifth Good or High Satisfactory rating
8. More detailed rating guidelines and PE disclo-
sure of individual performance rating factors
(i.e., ratings matrix)
9. Specialized compliance examiners and staff with
separate exams
10. Continued focus on LMI areas and people with
no consideration of race
11. Better and more timely disclosure of ratings,
PEs, and appeals
12. No CRA exemptions for federally-insured
depositories
13. Return to pre-GLB, more frequent, tiered exam
schedule based on ratings, ranging from 6
months (worst rating) to 24-30 months (best
rating)
14. Require that both the acquirer and acquiree in a
bank deal have passing (i.e., Satisfactory or bet-
ter) overall CRA ratings
15. Equal treatment of LMI-related outstanding
loans and investments vs.new ones made during
review period; no penalty for longer-term
instruments
16. Time-sensitive evaluation (and pro rata weight-
ing) of CRA performance over the entire review
period, without emphasizing most recent CRA
activities;limited pro rata credit for any new
CRA activities within six months of exam start
date with disclosure of same in PE
Source: K.H. Thomas,Ph.D.The Levy Economics Institute o f Bard College 67
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Lending Test
1. Addition of three new ratings factors:LMI
credit–related investments,LMI credit–related
CD services,and LMI credit–related retail 
banking services
2. Expansion of innovative/flexible rating factor to
more comprehensive“Qualitative Lending”one
which also includes consideration of any preda-
tory or other adverse LMI credit practices as well
as “referring-up” of subprime borrowers
3. 10 rating factors evaluated under current 5 
ratings (50 cells in ratings matrix) with ratings
matrix disclosed in PE
4. Reduced credit for purchased loans in AA vs.
originated loans to reflect additional costs and
risks associated with originations; mandatory PE
disclosure of amount of purchased vs. originated
loans in AA
5. No credit for purchased loans if double counting
or evidence of “loan swapping”among banks
6. Continue current treatment of letters of credit
with notation of their volume
(Continued)Public Policy Brief 68
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Table 6 Optimal CRA Reform Recommendations (Continued)
Large Retail Institutions:The Lending, Service,and Investment Tests
Investment Test
1. Eliminate and make part of
lending test
2. Only consider LMI
credit–related investments
with documentation of same
in PE
3. Initially make this test a
mandatory lending factor,
with possibility of making
optional as in case of small
bank test
4. Credit for all LMI-related
qualified investments outside
AA,as long as LMI credit
needs in AA being met




bank CDs with mandatory PE
disclosure of same
6. Credit for all LMI
credit–related qualified invest-
ments held during review
period,including long-matu-
rity ones that blanket the
review period
Service Test
1. Eliminate and make part of
lending test
2. Only consider LMI
credit–related services with
documentation of same in PE
3. Initially make this test a
mandatory lending factor,
with possibility of making
optional as in case of small
bank test
4. Credit for all LMI-related CD
services outside AA,as long as
LMI credit needs in AA being
met
CD Activities
1. Part of lending test 
2. Maintain current CD
definitions
3. Credit for all LMI-related CD
activities outside of AA,as
long as LMI credit needs in
AA being metThe Levy Economics Institute o f Bard College 69




Double current size minimum 
to $500 million for independents
and $2 billion for holding
companies
Limited Purpose and Wholesale
Institutions:The CD Test
1. More consistent definitions 
to insure special purpose
qualification
2. Only consider activities 
that can be documented as
LMI-related
3. Credit for LMI-related CD
activities outside of AA,as
long as LMI credit needs in
AA being met
4. Stricter application and dis-
closure of performance rating
factors and matrix to reduce
grade inflation
5. Limited credit for banks
electing single CD activity,
especially purchased invest-
ments, when performance
context dictates potential for
additional CD activities
6. Retain innovative and
complex considerations,
especially for banks with
single CD activities 
Strategic Plan (SP)
1. Eliminate SP option
2. Banks currently under SPs
will use elected backup exam
method
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Table 6 Optimal CRA Reform Recommendations (Continued)
Assessment Area (AA)
1. Retain existing AA
approach
2. Credit for LMI-related
CD activities,espe-
cially LMI lending,





local LMI credit needs
being met




small portion of loans
in AA will result in
lower weighting of AA
loan percentage rating















2. Maintain current pub-
lic file requirement
3. Do not consider or




1. More explicit use
prior to and during
exam as well as in PE
2. Required PE descrip-
tion of how PC
applied in weighting
performance rating
factors and the result-
ant impact on overall
ratingNotes
1. This bri ef is based largely on a Levy Econ omics In s ti tute Working Pa per
(Th omas 2002a).
2. An extensive literature exists on CRA:see, for example,Haag (2000) and
Litan, Retsinas, et al. (2000).
3. LMI is defined as an income of 80 percent or less of the median,that is,
$40,000 or less for U.S. families, according to the 2000 Census. This in-
cludes, by definition,about 40 percent of American families.
4 . It is intere s ting to note that the thrift and two of the three bank reg u l a tory
a gencies are curren t ly directed by form er bankers or bank attorn eys ,wi t h
the on ly excepti on being ex – Wa ll Streeter Alan Greenspan of the Fed .
5. The reforms recommended here call for a mandatory review and poten-
tial reform of CRA five years after the complete transition to the present
reforms; if the reforms due out in 2002 are fully transitioned by the end
of the following year, the next reform should occur in 2008.
6. The reforms recom m en ded here wi ll maintain the status quo of opti on a l
i nve s tm ent  and  servi ce  tests  in  the  small-bank  stre a m l i n ed  exam  to
i m prove a Sa ti s f actory ra ti n g.
7. The only other test evaluated in this way was the lending test, for which
20 percent could not be evaluated; thus, the investment test is at least
twice as problematic as the lending test in this regard.
8. This proposal should be viewed in light of the reputation of the bank’s
predecessor, First Union, as not being consumer- or CRA-friendly (see,
for example, Thomas 1998).
9. According to the October 17, 2001 CRA reform com m ent of the Cen ter
for Com mu n i ty Ch a n ge ,on ly 14 of 9 , 8 2 1 ,or 0.1 percent of F D I C - i n su red
i n s ti tuti ons have ch o s en the stra tegic opti on plan.
10. The fact that the new heads of both the OTS and FDIC are ex-bankers
is not unimportant, because the end result of the current activities may
be a regulatory-distorted CRA Triangle like that seen in Figure 2.
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AA assessment area
ANPR Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
CD community development
CRA Community Reinvestment Act
FDIC Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
FED Federal Reserve System
FFIEC Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council
GLB Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
HMDA Home Mortgage Disclosure Act
LMI low-to-moderate-income
LPB limited purpose bank
MBS  mortgage-backed securities
MSA  Metropolitan Statistical Area
NCRC National Community Reinvestment Coalition
OCC Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(U.S.Department of the Treasury)
OIG Office of Inspector General
OTS Office of Thrift Supervision
(U.S.Department of the Treasury)
PE Performance Evaluation
WB wholesale bank
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